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Within a general equilibrium framework of a developing economy with a foreign owned factor 
of production, this paper questions whether the informal-formal sector relationship is pro-
cyclical/ complementary – expansion or contraction in one necessarily implies an expansion 
or contraction in the other – when the informal sector is subject to a technological shock. We 
derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which a positive shock to the informal 
sector results in a contraction in both the size of the urban formal sector and the informal 
sector. Thus, although our result shows that the informal-formal sector relationship is pro-
cyclical, it nevertheless calls into question the conventional wisdom on the benefits of 
intervention in the informal sector of developing economies, particularly where multinational 
corporations sub-contract certain labor intensive stages of production to the informal sector. 
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Often described alternatively as the ‘unorganized sector’, ‘unregistered economy’, ‘third econ-
omy’, ‘parallel economy’ and the ‘shadow economy’, amongst others, the urban informal sec-
tor has become an integral part of the economic landscape across the developing economies
of Africa, Asia and Latin America. According to Chen (2006), informal employment broadly
deﬁned comprises one-half to three-quarters of nonagricultural employment in developing coun-
tries with 48% in North Africa; 51% in Latin America; 65% in Asia; and 72% in sub-Saharan
Africa1. Additionally, informal wage employment in developing countries comprises 30 to 40 per
cent of total informal employment (outside of agriculture). Although the origins of the urban
informal sector can be traced to the emergence of urban unemployment caused by rural-urban
migration and the absence of government support for the unemployed, there is little consen-
sus on the scope and deﬁnition of the informal sector (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom
2006). The only consensus seems to be that the informal sector encompasses a wide range of
activities (production, distribution and employment) and tend to fall outside the purview of
the regulated or formal economy (De Soto 1989; Portes, Castells and Benton 1989; Chen 2006).
Amongst sociologists, the structuralist school views the existence of the informal sector as a
relatively permanent feature of the modern economy integrated with its lead sectors (Portes,
Castells and Benton 1989). The linkages between the informal and the formal sector(s) is es-
tablished through the latter subcontracting certain labor intensive stages of production to the
former. The structuralists further contend that since the informal sector is integrally linked
with the formal sectors, given a constant level of state regulation, the informal-formal sector
relationship is pro-cyclical or in other words, complementary: expansion or contraction in one
necessarily implies an expansion or contraction in the other.
The purpose of this paper is to formalize the informal-formal sector relationship in a general
equilibrium framework and check whether this relationship is indeed pro-cyclical when the in-
formal sector is subject to a exogenous shock. We introduce a speciﬁc form of intervention
1Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) use data for the years 1999/2000 and show that the average the size of
the informal economy in Africa (in percent of GDP) was 42% with Zimbabwe (59.4%), Tanzania (58.3%), Nige-
ria (57.9%), Mozambique (40.3%), Cote d’Ivoire (39.9%), Madagascar (39.6%), Botswana (33.4%), Cameroon
(32.8%) and South Africa (28.4%) forming the highest to the lowest spectrum. In Asia, the average size of the
informal economy was 26% of oﬃcial GDP with Thailand (52.6%) as the highest and followed by Sri Lanka
(44.6%), Philippines (43.4%), India (23.1%), Israel (21.9%), Taiwan and China (19.6%), Singapore (13.1%) and
Japan (11.3%). The average size of informal economy in Latin America was 41% with the largest informal econ-
omy in Bolivia (67.1%), followed by Panama (64.1%) and Peru (59.9%). Argentina (25.4%) and Chile (19.8%)
had the lowest informal economies in Latin America.
1in the informal sector — a positive technological change that increases labor productivity for
workers in the informal sector, and analyze whether the informal and the formal sectors expand
or contract as a consequence. The reason for focusing on a positive technological change in the
informal sector stems from the recent debate on whether governments and NGOs should en-
courage informal sector workers to adopt newer technologies, have access to vocational schools
that enhance labor productivity or even have access to cheaper credit through microﬁnance
programs that improves business operations (see for example, Liimatainen 2002).
In the economics literature, the issue of formal-informal sector linkage opens up an interesting
but a relatively unexplored question of how a positive or negative shock originating in one
sector is transmitted, and more importantly, how these shocks may impact the lead and the
lag sectors of an economy. Two papers in this context are worth noting. First, Marjit (2003)
concludes that a contraction of the formal sector due to a trade reform (say, a lowering of the
tariﬀ) need not necessarily imply an impoverishment of the workers in the informal economy.
In fact, Marjit (2003) shows that informal employment and wages both rise subsequent upon
a contraction of the informal sector. The intuition behind Marjit’s (2003) result is as follows:
even though the informal sector produces an intermediate input for the formal sector, the in-
formal sector itself may have labor and capital intensive sub-segments. While a contraction of
the formal sector may lead to a contraction of the capital intensive sub-segment of the informal
sector, the labor-intensive sub-segment may well expand thereby creating a higher capacity
to absorb labor released by the formal sector. This latter eﬀect may lead to not only higher
employment levels but also higher wages in the informal sector. Second, Marjit, Kar and Beladi
(2007) show that a trade reform that lowers the price of the formal import-competing sector
may lead to an increase in both employment and wages in the informal sector. On the other
hand, a trade reform that increases the price of the formal export sector may increase wages
but deﬁnitely lowers employment in the informal sector2.
Our paper can thus be viewed as a contribution to the above literature in the broader context of
exploring the channels through which shocks are transmitted between the formal and informal
sectors of an economy. However, our model diﬀers from Marjit (2003) and Marjit, Kar and Be-
2In related papers on Economic Liberalization in developing countries with an informal sector, Chaudhuri
and Yabuuchi (2007) analyze the consequences of import tariﬀ reduction and foreign capital inﬂow on the
formal-informal sector wage inequality to show that foreign capital inﬂow reduces wage inequality between the
two sectors while import tariﬀ reduction tends to increase it. Roy (2006) studies the eﬀect of a subsidy to the
informal sector that when informal and formal sector outputs are imperfect substitutes of each other. Although
Roy studies intervention in the informal sector, the basic framework of our model and the issue of the informal
sector producing inputs for the formal sector is distinct from that of Roy’s.
2ladi (2006) in three important respects: (i) as opposed to tariﬀ reduction in the formal sector,
economic reform in this paper is modeled as the presence of a formal multinational sector that
sub-contracts intermediate stages of production to the informal sector; (ii) the existence of the
informal sector in our economy is in response to rural-urban migration of labor in search of a
higher urban formal sector wage rather than a secondary sector in either the urban or the rural
areas and (iii) the shock to the economy in our model originates within the informal sector
itself in contrast to an external shock to the formal sector.
Speciﬁcally, the framework we consider follows the cannonical formulation of the informal
sector due to Fields (1975), and its subsequent reﬁnements by Dutta-Chaudhuri (1989) and
Chandra and Khan (1993). Additionally, we introduce the presence of foreign capital in one
of the formal sectors of the economy  a la Chandra and Khan. This latter formulation con-
forms with the move by developing countries to attract multinationals in the urban areas of
an economy which, along with the domestic formal sectors, are known to sub-contract labor
intensive stages of production to the informal sector (Portes and Schauﬄer 1993). Alternative
to the “spatial” interpretation of multinationals locating in the urban areas of the economy,
our framework can also be interpreted in the “economic” sense in so far as these multinational
operations share some common characteristics with that of the urban formal sector in terms
of paying a higher mandated wage to workers as well as employing the same inputs as the ur-
ban formal sector — domestic capital and the informal sector output in the production process.
In our setting, the informal sector thus pertains to a set of economic enterprises that allows
the formal sectors of the economy (foreign capital-owned and domestic urban) to maintain a
competitive edge by: (a) reducing direct and indirect costs of production, (b) diﬀerentiating
production and (c) gaining access to a ﬂexible labor pool. We show that a positive shock to the
informal sector paradoxically results in a contraction in the size of the urban formal sectors as
well as the informal sector itself. Thus, although our result conforms with the structuralists’
view that the informal-formal sector relationship is pro-cyclical, it nevertheless calls into ques-
tion the conventional wisdom on the beneﬁts of intervention in the informal sector of developing
economies, particularly where multinational corporations sub-contract certain labor intensive
stages of production to the informal sector.
In the following sections we develop our model and analyze the eﬀect of a positive shock to the
informal sector on the factor rewards, employment and the sectoral output levels.
32 The Model
We consider a small open economy (a category under which most developing countries with a
large informal sector falls under) with four sectors, the rural, the domestic urban, the urban
informal and the foreign capital-owned multinational. In this economy, the urban wage paid
by the regulated domestic urban sector and the foreign capital-owned sector, is institutionally
ﬁxed at ¯ wu, and is the highest of all the wages in the economy3. This distortion in the labor
market gives rise to a rural-urban wage diﬀerential resulting in the equalization of the expected
urban wage to the rural wage in equilibrium4. A fraction of the urban labor force gets em-
ployed into the urban formal sectors of the economy, i.e the domestic urban and the foreign
capital-owned sector, while the rest, i.e., the urban unemployed, gets absorbed into the urban
informal sector whose wages are the lowest of all the wages in the economy. Furthermore, the
informal sector produces a non-traded intermediate good which is used by the domestic urban
sector and the foreign capital-owned sector as an input5. To sharpen focus and for analytical
purposes, consider the equations which formalize this economy.
The production functions of the four sectors, exhibiting constant returns to scale and dimin-
ishing marginal productivity to each factor are:
Xr = Fr(Lr; Kr) (1)
Xi = Fi(Li; Ki) (2)
Xu = Fu(Lu; Ku; Xu
i ) (3)
Xe = Fe(Le; Ke; Xe
i ; ¯ Kf) (4)
where X suitably subscripted, denotes the sectoral outputs respectively of the rural (r), infor-
mal (i), domestic urban (u) and the foreign capital-owned (e). The supply of foreign capital
(Kf) is ﬁxed and restricted only to the foreign capital-owned sector, however domestic capital
and labor is freely mobile between the four sectors. Finally, the rural, domestic urban and the
foreign capital-owned outputs are internationally traded, and given the small country assump-
tion the prices of these traded products are internationally determined.
3Such an institutionally set urban wage could be due to minimum wage regulations, labor unions or part of
an internationally mandated labor standard enforced by the domestic government.
4Along the lines of the Harris-Todaro hypothesis (1970).
5We assume that the domestic urban sector and the foreign capital-owned sector produce diﬀerentiated
varieties of the same product and as such shares, as a common input, the labor intensive intermediate good
produced by the urban informal sector.
4The material balance equations are:
Le + Lu + Lr + Li = L (5)
Ke + Ku + Lr + Ki = K (6)
Xe
i + Xu
i = Xi (7)
With the demand for foreign capital equaling its’ ﬁxed supply. Further, all four commodities
are produced at a positive output-price vector and perfect competition prevails in the economy.
Thus, the assumption of perfect competition along with that of constant returns to scale gives
the price equals unit cost equations as:
¯ Pr = Cr(wr; R) (8)
Pi = Ci(wi; R) (9)
¯ Pu = Cu( ¯ wu; R; Pi) (10)
¯ Pe = Ce( ¯ wu; R; Pi; ¯ Rf) (11)
The wage paid in the foreign capital-owned sector is the same as that paid in the domestic
urban sector and ¯ Rf, the return to foreign capital, is internationally ﬁxed. The price of the
informal sector output is determined within the model by the two urban formal sectors.
Labor market equilibrium condition is given by:
 ¯ wu + (1   )wi = wr (12)
where , the probability of employment in the two urban formal sectors (domestic urban and
foreign capital-owned) is given by:
 =
Lu + Le
Lu + Le + Li
Note that  is determined solely by equation (12) and hence by international prices.
The speciﬁcations of our model is thus complete. We have nineteen equations (including the
seven independent marginal productivity equations), nineteen unknowns and eleven parameters
(including the four production technologies). The model is decomposable in the sense that
factor prices are determined solely by commodity prices independently of factor endowments.
To see this, note that the return to domestic capital and the price of the informal sector output
is determined by the two urban formal sectors (equation (10) and (11)). Once the return
5to domestic capital and the price of the informal sector output is determined, equation (9)
determines the informal sector wage and equation (8) determines the rural wage. With the
informal and rural wages determined, equation (12) determines .
3 Technological Improvement in the Informal Sector
Consider now the eﬀect of a positive shock to the informal sector on factor rewards, sectoral
output levels and on the sectoral employment levels. Such a positive shock could be engendered,
as examples, through policy interventions such as vocational schools that improve labor produc-
tivity of workers or entrepreneurial skills of managers, or through access to better production
technology in the informal sector. Formally, and irrespective of the form of intervention, we
capture technological improvement as implying a reduction in the input-output coeﬃcients in
the informal sector.
Before proceeding it is instructive to oﬀer the following deﬁnition. Note that the two urban
formal sectors (domestic urban and foreign capital-owned), apart from using domestic labor and
domestic capital directly, also uses these two inputs indirectly through the use of the informal
sector output as intermediate inputs. It is thus only natural that the amount of domestic labor
and domestic capital used indirectly plays a crucial role in determining the factor intensities
of the two urban formal sectors. Further, since there is a labor market distortion, and the
subsistence wage of the urban unemployed is endogenized through the informal sector, we need
to deﬁne the factor intensities of the two urban formal sectors in employment adjusted terms.
Therefore,
Denition 1 The urban formal sectors (the domestic urban and the foreign capital-owned
sector) are said to be relatively more capital (labor) intensive, in the informal employment
adjusted gross sense, than the rural sector if and only if
signf(1   )(
xu



















i Ki +Km; m = u;e are respectively, the proportion of the informal output, the amount
of labor used indirectly and the amount of domestic capital used both indirectly and directly,
in the production of each of the urban formal sector outputs. Consider therefore,
Proposition 1 Technological improvement and factor rewards: Technological improvement in
6the informal sector leads only to an increase in the informal wage, wi, leaving unchanged the
price of the informal sector output, the return to domestic capital and the rural wage.
Since the return to domestic capital and the price of the informal sector output is determined
by the two urban formal sectors (the domestic urban and the foreign capital-owned sector),
technological improvement in the informal sector results only in an increase in the marginal
productivity of informal labor and is reﬂected in the higher informal sector wage. With the
price of the rural sector output internationally given and the return to domestic capital un-
changed, rural wage remains unaﬀected.
The next two propositions depend on the relative factor intensities of the two urban formal
sectors relative to the rural sector. Assuming that the urban formal sectors are both relatively
more capital intensive in the informal employment adjusted gross sense than the rural sector6,
then,
Proposition 2 Technological improvement in the informal sector and sectoral output levels:
Technological improvement in the informal sector leads to a decrease in the output of the do-
mestic urban sector and the informal sector, and an increase in the output of the rural sector
if and only if the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the informal sector is
greater than unity7. The output of the foreign capital-owned sector remains unchanged.
Proposition 3 Technological improvement in the informal sector and sectoral employment
levels: Technological improvement in the informal sector leads to a decrease in the probability of
employment in the formal urban sectors (and therefore increases the probability of employment
in the informal sector). Employment decreases in the domestic urban sector and the informal
sector and increases in the rural sector if and only if the elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital in the informal sector is greater than unity. Employment remains unchanged in the
foreign capital-owned sector.
The intuitions behind propositions 2 and 3 are as follows: consider ﬁrst the equation8
ˆ Xe = ˆ Kf   ˆ aKf
6Of course, the output eﬀects (and thus the employment eﬀects) in the domestic urban and rural sector and
the output eﬀect of the informal sector will be the exact opposite of the following results if we assume that the
rural sector was more capital intensive, in the informal employment adjusted gross sense, than the domestic
urban sector.
7We assume that capital and labor are substitutes in the production of the informal sector output, i.e, i > 0.
8Follows from the full employment condition aKfXe = Kf, where aKf is amount of foreign capital required
per unit of the foreign capital-owned sector output.
7With factor proportions ﬁxed by international prices (by virtue of our small country assump-
tion) and in the absence of technological change or an increase (decrease) in the foreign capital
inﬂow into the foreign capital-owned sector, the output of the foreign capital-owned sector is
completely determined once the endowment of foreign capital is known. It is therefore hardly
surprising that technological improvement in the informal sector has no eﬀect on the foreign
capital-owned sector’s output or on its usage of the domestic inputs.
Technological improvement in the informal sector however leads to: 1) an output eﬀect in the
informal sector such that every unit of output requires less amounts of labor and capital and
2) a substitution eﬀect in the informal sector such that capital (whose price has remained un-
changed) is substituted for labor (whose price has increased). If the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor in the informal sector is greater than unity then, in equilibrium,
the increased demand for capital by the informal sector results in an outﬂow of capital from
the domestic urban sector to the informal sector. Given that factor proportions are ﬁxed by
international prices in the domestic urban sector, there is a corresponding outﬂow of labor and
a reduction in the use of the intermediate input produced by the informal sector which has
the eﬀect of causing a contraction in the size of the domestic urban sector. The reduction
in the use of the informal sector output by the domestic urban sector reduces the aggregate
demand for the former’s output, causing a parallel contraction in the informal sector. Finally,
the excess labor and capital released from the urban sectors (formal and informal) is absorbed
by the rural sector resulting in an increase in rural output9.
Turning to the employment eﬀects, from equation (12) it is clear that with the institutionally
set urban wage and the rural wage remaining unchanged, an increase in the informal sector
wage leads to a decrease in the probability of employment in the formal urban sectors (domes-
tic urban and foreign capital-owned). This in turn implies an increase in the probability of
employment in the informal sector in order to maintain labor market equilibrium. Since factor
proportions are ﬁxed by international prices in the foreign capital-owned, the domestic urban
9A logical question that arises at this point is: why is the increased demand for capital by the informal sector
not met by an outﬂow of capital from the rural sector? In that case the informal and the domestic urban sector
can both expand at the expense of the rural sector. The reasoning is this: suppose there is an outﬂow of capital
(and therefore labor) from the rural sector leading to the informal sector absorbing a part of this capital and
thereby increasing its output. The domestic urban sector would then absorb this increase in the informal sector
output (at the unchanged price of latter) and since factor proportions are ﬁxed by international prices in the
former, it would also proportionately increase its usage of capital and labor. Since the urban formal sectors
are relatively more capital intensive, in the informal employment adjusted gross sense, than the rural sector the
amount of capital released by the rural sector would be insuﬃcient to meet this increased demand. Along with
excess labor in the urban region the economy would thus be at a disequilibrium.
8and the rural sectors10, employment in the foreign capital-owned sector remains unchanged,
decreases in the domestic urban sector and increases in the rural sector. Employment in the
informal sector falls due to the combined eﬀect of (i) the domestic urban sector reducing its
demand for the intermediate input and (ii) a concurrent substitution eﬀect (capital for labor)
within the informal sector.
The conventional wisdom that a positive shock to the informal sector is beneﬁcial to informal
labor in particular, and to the informal sector in general, does not hold if the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital in the informal sector is greater than unity and where
one of the urban formal sectors is characterized by the presence of a foreign owned factor of
production. A positive shock to the informal sector through an eﬀort to raise the productivity
of workers, entreprenuerial skills, access to better technology or a credit subsidy to generate
employment in the informal sector11 results in the terms of trade moving against labor, and
ultimately culminating in a contraction of not only the informal sector but also the size of the
urban formal sectors as well. At least in this regard, the informal-formal sector relationship
is pro-cyclical: contraction of the informal sector causes a parallel contraction in one of the
urban formal sectors while the other urban formal sector which uses an additional ﬁxed factor
(foreign capital) remains stagnant, irrespective of which of the urban formal sectors uses the
informal sector output intensively.
While our analysis above underscores the conditions under which interventions in the informal
sector can be harmful to an economy, the informal sector in developing economies plays a vital
role in generating employment to a substantial segment of the population, particularly where
employment opportunities in the formal sector is limited. In this respect, it is worth exploring
existing evidence that points to the likelihood that the elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital is indeed greater than one in the informal sector of developing countries. Unfor-
tunately, empirical studies on the measurement of the elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital in the informal sector of developing countries is rare primarily because of the diﬃ-
culty in garnering reliable data from ﬁrms that self-select into this sector to avoid regulations
and taxes, and also because of the diﬃculty in estimating capital stock since most machines
10Thus, ˆ Xe = ˆ Le, ˆ Xu = ˆ Lu and ˆ Xr = ˆ Lr.
11It can easily be checked that a credit subsidy to the informal sector will have the same eﬀect on outputs
and employment levels as long as the urban formal sectors are relatively more capital intensive, in the informal
employment adjusted gross sense, than the rural sector. However, no condition need to be imposed on the
elasticity of substitution as long as it is greater than zero. Also a credit subsidy to the informal sector reduces
the return to capital there by an exact proportion to the subsidy. The return to capital in the other sectors
remains unchanged.
9used in this sector are second-hand (Pack, 1976). Therefore, the best guess on the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital in the informal sector of developing countries has to be
gleaned from either (i) empirical studies using data from manufacturing sectors, intermediate
goods sectors and small scale manufacturing ﬁrms and/or (ii) theoretical studies or Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) models that use values of the elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital based on available data from developing countries.
Some studies using econometric estimations of aggregate production functions in the manufac-
turing sectors show that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is considerable
(Gaude, 1975). Pack (1976) in a study of the choice of techniques in Kenyan manufacturing
ﬁrms found that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the smaller manu-
facturing ﬁrms to be quite high. Yet, Pack observes that operators or managers favor a labor
intensive technology simply because the wage rate is very low. Kalim (2001) analyzes speciﬁ-
cations of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function to estimate the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor using cross-section data on 144 ﬁve-digit in-
dustries in Pakistan over the 1995-96 time period. Kalim ﬁnds that elasticity of substitution to
be 1.62 for the intermediate goods industries which indicates a very strong eﬀect of real wages
on labor productivity. On the other hand, the size of the elasticity of substitution is 0.85 for
the capital goods industries. Khan (2006) analyzes a four-sector (two formal and two informal)
model where the formal sectors use skilled labor, unskilled labor and capital while the informal
sector uses unskilled labor and capital and assumes elasticity of substitution values between
these three factors to be between 0.8 and 2 to simulate the impact of poverty reduction strate-
gies in South Asia. Finally, motivated by data gathered through household surveys in Argentina
between 1993-1995, Amaral and Quintin (2004) describe a model where signiﬁcant diﬀerences
arise between formal and informal workers even though labor markets are perfectly competitive
and show that, in equilibrium, the informal sector emphasizes low-skill work because informal
managers have less access to outside ﬁnancing, and as a result, choose to substitute low-skill
labor for physical capital. The main theoretical assumption in Amaral and Quintin (2004) that
ﬁts empirical observations of informal sector activity in Argentina is based on the technologi-
cal assumption that unskilled labor is a better substitute for physical capital than skilled labor.
Turning ﬁnally to policy implications of our study, it should be noted that the emergence,
existence and expansion of the informal economy is in large part a response to regulations and
taxes imposed on the formal sectors. To wit, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998)
10ﬁnd a positive correlation between the size of the informal economy and the corporate tax
burden. Further, based on a survey of small ﬁrms in Brazil, de Paula and Scheinkman (2007),
conclude that the choice of an entrepreneur to operate in the informal sector is driven by the
motive to avoid taxes which formal sector ﬁrms are required to pay. Speciﬁcally, de Paula and
Scheinkman show that in a vertically integrated production process, a credit system of value
added taxes12 transmits informality along the production chain in the sense that the informal-
ity of a ﬁrm is positively correlated with the informality of the ﬁrms from which it buys and
sells. However, when the credit system of a value added tax is replaced by a value added tax
applied at any arbitrary stage of production, this chain eﬀect on informality disappears.
In light of the analytics of this paper, we can conclude that taxes on the formal sector output,
or a tax on the use of the informal sector output used by the formal sectors might lead to a
contraction of the formal and informal sectors by ﬁrst reducing input demand in the formal
sector and subsequently in the informal sector due to the pro-cyclical nature of the relationship
between the two. Likewise, a subsidy to capital used by the informal sector as well as policies
that reduce the input-output coeﬃcients in the informal sector directly ( such as, increased
labor productivity, managerial skills or access to better technology) also leads to a contraction
of the formal and informal sectors. In this latter respect, the contribution of our paper lies
in identifying that technological improvements in the informal sector is harmful to economic
growth in developing economies embarking on economic reforms through foreign capital-owned
enterprises and characterized by forward linkages between the formal and informal sectors of
the economy. Needless to say, identiﬁcation of pro-growth policies through interventions in the
formal or informal sectors of our model remains an agenda for future research.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.
Using equations (9), (10) and (11) along with Jones’s (1965) hat calculus and the Wong-Viner





























Where ’s suitably subscripted, denote the share of the input in the total income of an unit of
12Under this system the value added tax applies to each sale and each stage of production receives a credit
for the amount of tax paid in the previous stages of the production stage.





































R, the determinant of the matrix is given by,
jRj =  Lr
¯ wu   wi
wr
< 0













=jRj > 0 (14)
Proof of proposition 2.
The cost minimization condition in the informal sector is;
Liˆ aLi + Kiˆ aKi = 0:
Again,
ˆ aKi   ˆ aLi = i( ˆ wi   ˆ R):
Manipulating the above two equations we get,
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: (15)
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12Using equations (5), (6), (7), the fact that demand for foreign capital equals its ﬁxed supply,
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i + 1)g = M > 0:
Assuming that the urban formal sectors are relatively more capital intensive, in the informal
employment adjusted gross sense, than the rural sector and applying Cramer’s rule to the out-
put matrix yields,
  Xu
^  =  KfLrfKi(1   i)(1   )   Mkrg=jHj > 0 if and only if i > 1.
  Xe
^  = 0
  Xr
^  =  Kff(Ku + xu
i Ki)M   KiLi(1   i)g=jHj < 0 if and only if i > 1.
  Xi
^  =  Kfxu
i LrfKi(1   i)(1   )   Mkrg=jHj > 0 if and only if i > 1.
However, for output of the domestic urban formal sector and the informal sector to increase
and the output of the rural sector to decrease a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition is
that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the informal sector is less than
unity. The urban sectors will expand and the rural sector will contract only if i < 1 and if
Ki(1   i)(1   ) > Mkr and KiLi(1   i) > (Ku + xu
i Ki)M.
Proof of proposition 3






i + 1) +
  Xi
ˆ 
13Employment in the informal sector falls as the second term on the right hand side of the above
equation reinforces the ﬁrst term.
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